Plaintiff's lawyer predicts "massive" climate change litigation; proving causation remains challenging

Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald recently published an interview with Gerald Maples, the lead plaintiff’s attorney in Comer v. Murphy Oil. In Comer, fourteen individuals filed a class action lawsuit against insurance, oil, coal and chemical companies seeking relief for property damages resulting from Hurricane Katrina, alleging that defendants’ emissions contributed to climate change and thus magnified adverse weather events, including Hurricane Katrina. The district court dismissed the Comer case on constitutional standing and political question grounds. The interview provides interesting insight into the case, the complaint, the plaintiff’s views on causation, and possible future climate litigation against private parties and the government.

In the interview, Maples declares the scientific debate about climate change “over” – relying on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change‘s conclusion that the emission of greenhouse gases from human activities has resulted in a measurable increase in temperature, which in turn has significant local, national and global health and environmental effects. He asserts that this scientific certainty has driven a shift in litigation defense strategy away from the science to the standing/political question defense. According to Maples “that’s essentially what the ‘standing’ defense is about. It’s too great of an issue for the courts. It has to be handled by the political leaders.”

But as noted in other posts and articles, the regulatory and quasi-regulatory conclusions that climate change is influenced by human activities do not address the specific causation questions that must be addressed in a tort case like Comer, which seeks to hold corporations responsible for damage caused by climate change. The fact that those battles have not occurred in Comer may not represent a shift in defense strategy – those battles have simply been unnecessary because the complaint was dismissed for lack of standing (“the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims against Defendants and that Plaintiffs’ claims are non-justiciable pursuant to the political question doctrine”).

The interview cites Maples’ view on proximate cause as follows: “Proximate cause is not simply cause in fact. We know what the cause in fact is – the science has told us that. But proximate cause has to do more with who could have prevented it.” While this definition doesn’t track Black’s Law Dictionary – which uses phrases like “[t]he last negligent act contributory to an injury, without which such injury would not have resulted,” and “[t]he dominant, moving or producing cause” – it does identify clear causation hurdles that the Comer plaintiffs must overcome if the dismissal of their case is reversed. In establishing cause in fact, plaintiffs would have to establish that Hurricane Katrina would not have occurred without defendant’s emissions. In other words, if Comer is reversed, causation looms large as an obstacle to plaintiffs’ success on the merits.

Causation problems notwithstanding, Maples states that, if Comer is reversed, new work done by Oxford University will help make his case and spur “massive litigation”:

It’s been tracked with great precision, as far as what each corporation’s contribution is, and that can now be extrapolated – especially based on some of the work, the computer modelling that’s coming out of Oxford University – that can now be extrapolated to a percentage of fault. It’s fantastic work that’s been done. Apparently it’s even more sophisticated than the work out of the University of Colorado.

They now can model the effect of man-made carbon contributions to the atmosphere, and the contribution that it has to global weather events. A (newspaper) article was sent to me a few weeks ago - it’s worth a story in and of itself probably - because the comment made was that it was going to lead to massive litigation.

While it is not clear what computer modelling Maples refers to, it may be that he is commenting on a “summary report” stating “preliminary findings” of B. Müller, Ch. Ellermann, M. Friman, N. Höhne, and R. Verheyen, entitled Differentiating (Historic) Responsibilities for Climate Change, available on the website of a company called Oxford Climate Policy. This preliminary report does not appear to be the kind of peer reviewed analysis that might support specific causation claims and is in large part focused on the philosophical questions of how responsibility should be shared for addressing climate change on an ongoing basis (not on the question of apportioning liability, based on cause, for climate change in general or specific weather events). Indeed, the report states as much in its conclusion: “The aim of this Report was to put forward and discuss a methodology for the numerical differentiations of responsibilities for climate change as opposed to calculating causal contributions to climate change.”

Still, Maples predicts “massive litigation” in the future from “big farming interests” who suffer droughts, to “communities ravaged by wildfires,” to “ski resorts that have no snow.” Maples says that the strategic model for the litigation will be based on tobacco litigation: “What’s good about the approach that I’m taking is that the tobacco litigation – and before that the asbestos litigation – demonstrates that one case can cause a gigantic litigation problem for corporations. It’s pretty much accepted history that asbestos and tobacco are the role models for climate change litigation now.”

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